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JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE ILLINOIS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT'S
RULEMAKING PROVISIONS
ROBERT P. BURNS*
Illinois courts will soon be called upon to interpret the rulemaking
procedures provided by the recently adopted Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act.' In so doing, the courts will have the benefit of a sub-
stantial body of case law from other jurisdictions interpreting similar
provisions. 2 In addition, the Illinois courts will be aided by the vigor-
ous and searching debate of judges and commentators on the relative
merit of different approaches.3 That debate has perforce touched on
some of the most basic legal and philosophical issues of modern gov-
ernment. This is not surprising. "Because it is so directly concerned
with reconciling government power and private interests, administra-
tive law is peculiarly vulnerable to the intellectual and social pressures
resulting from the juxtaposition of frayed ideals and current realities. ' 4
Technical issues concerning judicial interpretation of the IAPA's proce-
dural requirements for rulemaking and those concerning the scope and
* Staff attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. The Illinois Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter referred to as IAPA or Illinois
Act] was adopted by Public Act 79-1083, effective September 22, 1975. Public Act 80-1035, en-
acted June 29, 1977, amended the IAPA and provided that as of January 1, 1978, "in case of
conffict between the provisions of this Act and the Act creating or conferring power on an agency,
. . . [the IAPA] shall control." Public Act 80-1035 § 2, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1002 (1977).
The Act defined agency as "each State Board, commission, department, or officer, other than the
Governor, legislature, or the courts, authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested
cases." IAPA § 3.01, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1003.01 (1977). See also Note, 1976 U. ILL. L.F.
803.
2. Although there are important exceptions, "experience has demonstrated that the analo-
gous federal model often proves determinative" in resolving issues in Illinois administrative law.
Gray, Administrative Law in Illinois.- Recent Trends and Developments, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 511, 540
(1977).
3. See, e.g., I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 6:1-6:39 (2d ed. 1978) [herein-
after cited as DAVIS]; Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Stewart]; Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA.
L. REV. 185 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Verkuil]; Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process.
The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
4. Stewart, supra note 3, at 1813. For analysis of the economic and social developments
preceding and resulting in pervasive government regulation see K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANS-
FORMATION (1944) which remains a classic work. See also T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM
(1969); Jaffe & Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law.- Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. REV.
345 (1956).
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method of substantive judicial review of agency rules are inevitably
tied to these broader questions about the role of administrative law in
effecting government's varied and competing goals.5 Illinois courts will
be addressing these issues, most often implicitly, in an authoritative
manner as they move through the "dense complexity ' 6 of a new era in
Illinois administrative law. 7
This article will focus on the procedural requirements of section 5
of the Illinois APA. 8 These procedural requirements must be viewed
5. See, e.g., J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 70 (1971) (regarding the relationship between
efficiency and justice as aims of social institutions). See also H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RE-
SPONSIBILITY 10 (1968) (regarding the multiplicity of aims and principles of major social institu-
tions).
6. Stewart, supra note 3, at 1813.
7. It has only been in the 1970's that administrative law has reached a point where it can
justly be said that "of all the tools that goverment has for carrying out programs enacted by the
legislative body, rulemaking procedure is rapidly becoming the dominant one." DAVIS, supra
note 3, § 6:1 at 448.
8. This section of the IAPA provides:
(a) Prior to the adoption, amendment or repeal of any rule, each agency shall:
1. give at least 45 days' notice of its intended action. This notice period shall com-
mence on the first day the notice appears in the Illinois Register. The notice shall in-
clude a text of the proposed rule, or the old and new materials of a proposed
amendment, or the text of the provision to be repealed; the specific statutory citation
upon which the proposed rule, the proposed amendment to a rule or the proposed repeal
of a rule is based and is authorized; a description of the subjects and issues involved; and
the time, place and manner in which interested persons may present their views and
comments concerning the intended action. In addition, the Secretary of State shall pub-
lish and maintain the Illinois Register and set forth the manner in which agencies shall
submit the notices required by this Act to him for publication in the Illinois Register.
The Illinois Register shall be published at least once each week on the same day unless
such day is an official State holiday in which case the Illinois Register shall be published
on the next following business day and sent to subscribers who subscribe for the publica-
tion with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may charge a subscription price
to subscribers that covers mailing and publication costs;
2. afford all interested persons who submit a request within 14 days after notice of
the proposed change is published in the Illinois Register reasonable opportunity to sub-
mit data, .views, arguments or comments, which may, in the discretion of the agency, be
submitted either orally or in writing or both. The notice published in the Illinois Regis-
ter of the Secretary of State shall indicate the manner selected by the agency for such
submissions. The agency shall consider fully all submissions respecting the proposed
rule.
(b) If any agency finds that an emergency, reasonably constituting a threat to the
public interest, safety or welfare, requires adoption of a rule upon fewer than 45 days'
notice and states in writing its reasons for that finding, it may proceed without prior
notice or hearing or upon any abbreviated notice and hearing that it finds practicable, to
adopt an emergency rule. The rule may be effective for a period of not longer than 150
days but the agency's authority to adopt an identical rule under subsections (a)(l) and
(a)(2) of this Section is not precluded.
(c) No action by any agency to adopt, amend or repeal a rule after this Act has
become applicable to the agency shall be valid unless taken in compliance with this
Section. A proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of this Section must be commenced within 2 years from the
effective date of the rule.
(d) The notice and publication requirements of this Section do not apply to a mat-
ter relating solely to agency management, personnel practices, or to public property,
loans or contracts.
(e) If any agency is required by federal law or federal rules and regulations or by
an order of court to adopt a rule under conditions which preclude the agency's compli-
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and interpreted as they relate to the traditional responsibility of Illinois
courts to provide "substantive" review of rules to determine whether
they are arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or beyond the delegated
power of the agency.9 A major benefit of the IAPA's rulemaking re-
quirements is that they significantly enlarge the courts' repertoire of
approaches to substantive judicial review of agency rules.' 0
This article first will discuss the underlying premises of the admin-
istrative rulemaking procedure, that is, the legislative "purpose" which
a court interpreting those procedures must seek to effect." It then will
analyze the Illinois Act's specific provisions for rulemaking, comparing
them to those of the federal statute' 2 and the Revised Model State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.13 Next, the IAPA's requirements of notice
of intended rulemaking' 4 and the "issues involved,"' 5 and of reason-
able opportunity for interested persons to comment, 16 with the agen-
cies' corresponding responsibility to "consider fully ' 17 all such
comments, will be treated. This will be followed by a short discussion
of the Act's provisions for rulemaking petitions.' 8 Finally, the article
will consider the relationship between the courts' enforcement of the
IAPA's procedural provisions and substantive judicial review of agency
rules.
ance with the notice or hearing requirement of this Act, the agency may proceed to adopt
such a rule upon filing with the Secretary of State.
IAPA § 5, as amended by Public Act 80-1035 § I, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005 (1977).
The IAPA also permits individuals to "petition an agency requesting the promulgation,
amendment or repeal of a rule." IAPA § 8, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1008 (1977). That provi-
sion also will be considered in this article.
9. See, e.g., Illinois Coal Operators Ass'n v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 111. 2d 305, 319
N.E.2d 782 (1974); Peabody Coal Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 36 Ill. App. 3d 5, 344
N.E.2d 279 (1976); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 25 111. App. 3d
271, 282, 323 N.E.2d 84, 90-91, aff'd in part, rev'd in par, 62 111. 2d 494, 343 N.E.2d 459 (1974).
These cases involved review of regulations under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111I/2, §§ 1101- 1150 (1977). Since the Environmental Protection Act does not pre-
scribe a specific standard of review, review of regulations under that Act is conducted according to
the general Illinois common law standards for review of rules.
10. See text accompanying notes 139-52 infra.
11. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 56.02 (4th ed. 1973).
12. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
APA].
13. THE 1961 REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §§ 1-19, 13 UNI-
FORM LAWS ANN. 355 (Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited as the Revised Model State APAJ.
14. JAPA § 5(a)(l), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(1) (1977).
15. Id.
16. IAPA § 5(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(2) (1977).
17. Id.
18. See IAPA § 8, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1008 (1977).
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UNDERLYING PREMISES
Judge J. Skelly Wright' 9 has identified the specific kind of "fair-
ness" which should characterize a rulemaking procedure in contrast to
that germane to adjudication. In the typical adjudication, whether
criminal, civil, or administrative, the tribunal must primarily decide
which version of the relevant facts is true. The parties' versions of the
facts are usually framed in terms of a largely preexisting legal stan-
dard:20 one party attempts to demonstrate certain relevant facts, and
the opposing party either argues that the first party has failed to bear
his burden of proof or he attempts to demonstrate another version. In
adjudication, then, fairness is largely equivalent to accuracy;21 the
traditional assumptions of Anglo-American jurisprudence are that
accurate factfindings will most likely emerge from an adversary pro-
ceeding, conducted according to evidentiary and procedural rules cal-
culated to make effective the rights of confrontation and cross-exami-
nation.22
As Judge Wright argues, 23 the distinctive kind of "fairness" appro-
priate to administrative rulemaking cannot be assimilated to the con-
cept of accuracy. A "rule allocates benefits and penalties among large
classes of individuals according to a specific normative standard, and
the fairness of such an allocation is ultimately a political or philosophi-
cal question. '24 Nonetheless, there is a kind of fairness distinctive to
19. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
20. But see E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); K. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH (1960).
21. Wright, supra note 3, at 379.
22. The rule against the admission of hearsay evidence, for example, is founded on the cen-
trality of cross-examination in the common-law trial. See, e.g., Grand Liquor Co. v. Department
of Revenue, 67 III. 2d 195, 367 N.E.2d 1238 (1977); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1365 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974).
23. Wright, supra note 3, at 379.
24. Id. Although administrative officers, for the most part, are not elected officials, agencies
exercise legislative, judicial, and executive powers. Thus their exercise of discretionary power
over liberty and property lacks both the legitimacy which popular election has traditionally
thought to confer on such power and the limitations which the American political tradition has
looked to the separation of powers to impose. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 49 (J. Madison); G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 548-49 (1969). In the face of this dishar-
mony between the reality of administrative practice and received ideas about legitimacy and con-
trol of government power, some early writers relied on the notion that administrative agencies
exercised a relatively value-free expertness, immune from the political process and guided by
solely technical and scientific judgment. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). It
is now generally recognized that the exercise of agency discretion in rulemaking and in other
informal action, which vague statutory delegation of power makes necessary, inevitably involves
political, philosophical, and normative decisions which present the original issues of legitimacy
and control. See Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administrator, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183 (1973);
Stewart, supra note 3, at 1671-88, 1802-13. See also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRE-
LIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
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rulemaking:
Put simply, thepublic is treated unfairly when a rulemaker hides his
crucial decisions, or his reasons for them, or when he fails to give
good faith attention to all the information and contending views rele-
vant to the issues before him. To this notion of fairness-that
rulemaking must be openly informed, reasoned, and candid-there is
a two-fold logic. First, if administrators rule in obscurity, [the legis-
lature] cannot intelligently delegate power or police the exercise of
power already delegated. Second, although the 'public interest' can-
not be objectively defined, one can safely conclude that administra-
tors who ignore relevant facts and who take the counsel of blind
prejudice will serve the 'public interest' only by the operation of
chance. Therefore, although a rulemaker's decisions cannot be 'ac-
curate' in the conventional sense, and although regulated parties
have no fundamental 'right' to participate in rulemaking, the admin-
istrator owes a duty to the public to give serious consideration to all
reasonable contentions and evidence pertinent to the rules he is con-
sidering. 25
Judge Wright argues that the APA rulemaking procedures26 are
designed directly to enforce the administrator's duty to give "good faith
consideration" to serious contentions and to avoid "the counsel of
blind prejudice." The major part of the judicial function in relation to
agency rulemaking is thus to give the APA's rulemaking provisions
a "properly expansive reading" 27 which ensures that the required dia-
logue between agency experts and members of the public occurs. A
court will thus upset an agency rule promulgated with "no reasons, or
merely conclusory reasons, for adopting the rule or for rejecting evi-
dence, criticism, or alternatives submitted by outsiders. ' 2 Remand of
the rule would also be necessary, for example, "when the agency has
relied on important findings, assumptions or techniques not made pub-
25. Wright, supra note 3, at 379-80 (emphasis in original).
26. Judge Wright's reference is to section 553 of the federal APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 ( 9 76),
which governs "informal" rulemaking, as does section 5 of the IAPA, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. '27,
§ 1005 (1977). See text accompanying notes 31-50 infra, for a comparison of these statutes.
27. Wright, supra note 3, at 380.
28. The basis for such a reversal according to Judge Wright, could be the violation of the
"procedural" requirement in the federal APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), that "[aifter consideration of
the relevant matter presented" the agency must "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise and
general statement of their basis and purpose." Wright, supra note 3, at 380, 396. Such an agency
failure would also violate what he takes to be the "substantive" standard of judicial review, that
the agency show "good faith consideration" to all relevant factors. Wright, supra note 3, at 380,
396. In his view, however, if it were determined that the agency were acting within the scope of its
authority the judicial function would be exhausted once it was decided that, as a matter of psycho-
logical fact, the agency actually considered such factors. Wright, supra note 3, at 380, 396. It
would seem, however, that judicial review of agency rules under an "arbitrary, capricious, unrea-
sonable or not in accordance with law" standard would require some scrutiny of the relative
weight given such factors. See text accompanying notes 139-52, infra.
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lic prior to the rule's promulgation" 29 because this would violate the
APA's notice provision, and strike at the heart of rulemaking proce-
dure.
There is a residual judicial function not exhausted by enforcement
of rulemaking procedures, even rulemaking procedures such as those in
the IAPA which explicitly require that an agency give "full considera-
tion" to comments. 30 But it is surely true that the contribution which
courts will make in the area of administrative rules and rulemaking
will be, to a great extent, the enforcement of those requirements.
RULEMAKING UNDER THE ILLINOIS ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
Section 3.09 of the IAPA defines "rule" as:
each agency statement of general applicability that implements, ap-
plies, interprets or prescribes law or policy, but does not include (a)
statements concerning only the internal management of an agency
and not affecting private rights or procedures available to persons or
entities outside the agency, (b) informal advisory rulings issued pur-
suant to section 9, (c) intra-agency memoranda or (d) the prescrip-
tion of standardized forms.3 1
It is to such "rules" that the rulemaking provisions of section 532 and
29. Wright, supra note 3, at 396.
30. Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has been the foremost advocate of the view that courts should limit their efforts in the area of
informal rulemaking to purely procedural questions: both enforcing the literal requirements of
the APA and imposing procedural devices, such as cross-examination, on informal rulemaking
which go quite far beyond the Act's provisions, even expansively interpreted. See International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541
F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). This approach provoked an extreme
reaction to judicially mandated procedural innovations in informal rulemaking in Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542-48, (1978)
(dicta). (For varying assessments of the Vermont Yankee case and its likely effects, see DAVIS,
supra note 3, §§ 6:35-6:37, and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.: Three Perspectives, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804 (1978) (series of three commentaries by
Stewart, Byse, and Breyer)). See also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975) (statement
of reasons in informal action required, although not literally mandated by the APA, to facilitate
judicial review and to "assure careful administrative consideration.") Judge Wright's "full consid-
eration" standard of substantive judicial review represents an incomplete advance over purely
procedural "tinkering" with rulemaking procedure in that it insulates from judicial scrutiny even
the most irrational normative judgments made by agencies in rulemaking. See DAVIS, supra note
3, § 6:6. For a discussion of the limited situations in which cross-examination should be judicially
required in informal rulemaking see DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:20 at 547-5 1. For attempts to deline-
ate the circumstances in which courts should intervene, on substantive grounds, in informal
rulemaking see note 139, infra.
31. IAPA § 3.09, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1003.09 (1977). Section 9 of the IAPA, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 127, § 1009 (1977), allows each agency to "provide by rule for ... disposition of peti-
tions for declaratory rulings" on the applicability of statutes, regulations or agency orders and
makes such rulings unappealable.
32. IAPA § 5, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005 (1977). In addition to agency action excluded
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the other IAPA provisions concerning rules apply. 33 This definition is
clearly very broad, and the IAPA rulemaking provisions thus govern a
larger percentage of agency action than does the federal Act, which
excludes, most significantly, an agency's interpretations of the statutes
it administers, so-called interpretive rules.
34
The IAPA provides only one general procedure for the adoption of
agency rules, 35 although the organic statutes under which agencies
by the definition of "rule," section 5 of the IAPA specifically excludes from rulemaking provisions
"a matter relating solely to agency management, personnel practices, or to public property, loans
or contracts." IAPA § 5(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(d) (1977). The comparable subsection
in the federal Act excludes "a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts." 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1976). The Illinois rulemak-
ing provisions thus apply to those "public . . . grants [and] benefits" which the federal Act ex-
cludes. See Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property,
Loans, Grants, Benets or Contracts, 118 U. PA. REV. 540 (1970). The Revised Model State APA
contains no comparable exclusion of rulemaking from notice and comment procedures beyond
that excluded by the definition of "rule," which is in some ways slightly less, and in other ways
slightly more, inclusive than the Illinois definition. Compare IAPA § 3.09, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
127, § 1003.09 (1977) with REVISED MODEL STATE APA, supra note 13, § 1(7).
The IAPA treats ratemaking as a separate agency function, subject neither to the provisions
controlling rulemaking nor to those controlling contested cases. IAPA §§ 3.08, 17, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 127, §§ 1003.08, 1017 (1977). For an analysis of the danger of "secret systems of law"
growing up under the guise of the "intra-agency memoranda" exception to the definition of rule,
see DAVIS, supra note 3, § 1:1 1 at 39. In Illinois the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules,
whose function is delineated by the IAPA at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 1007.02-1007.10, has
acted to reduce this sort of abuse.
33. This article will focus on section 5 of the IAPA and its relationship to judicial review of
rules and rulemaking. Other sections of the IAPA concerning rules require each agency to adopt
rules of practice for formal hearings, IAPA § 4(a)(l), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1004(a)(l) (1977);
require rules describing agency organization, id., § 1004.01(a)(I); approved procedures for public
access to information and rules for submitting requests to the agency, id., § 1004.0 1(a)(2); require
the creation by rule of tables of contents and indices to the agency's current rules and of descrip-
tions of the agency's rulemaking process, id., § 1004.01(a)(3). All of these rules may be adopted
without notice and comment, id., § 1004.01(b). Each agency is also required to prescribe the
forms and procedures for petitions for the adoption of rules by the public, id., § 1008. The IAPA
provides for filing of final rules with the Secretary of State, id, § 1006, and for their publication in
the Illinois Register, id., § 1006(b).
34. Professor Davis seems unsure of the wisdom of imposing notice and comment require-
ments on interpretive rules, since doing so may discourage agencies from issuing them. DAVIS,
supra note 3, § 1:11 at 42. For a discussion of the history of judicial attempts to define "rule,"
usually in contradistinction to "order," see Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act.
Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, the Rulemaking Process, 60
IOWA L. REV. 731, 824-26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield]. Bonfield's article, written on the
occasion of Iowa's enactment of a variant of the Revised Model State APA, is so "comprehensive
and penetrating" that it should be useful in all jurisdictions. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 1:10 at 37.
Bonfield catalogues the previously existing literature, relatively small in light of the importance of
the subject. Bonfield, at 745 n.50.
35. The Act permits an agency to adopt an emergency rule upon a finding, supported by
written reasons, that "an emergency, reasonably constituting a threat to the public interest, safety
or welfare, requires adoption of a rule upon fewer than 45 days' notice." IAPA § 5(b), ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(b) (1977). Such a rule may remain in effect for no longer than 150 days. Id.
If the rule is to remain in effect beyond that period, the agency is required to submit it to regular
notice and comment procedure as a proposed (permanent) rule. Because the IAPA does not con-
tain the general provision of the federal Act allowing an agency to exempt rules from the notice
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
function may require fuller procedures. 36 This is in sharp contrast to
the federal Act, which creates two distinct procedures for rulemaking.37
Section 553 of the federal Act 38 sets out the requirements for "informal
rulemaking," that is, the "notice and comment" procedure similar to
that which the Illinois Act provides. Sections 556 and 557 of the fed-
eral Act 39 set forth the more demanding requirements for rules which
the agency's organic statute requires to be made "on the record," that
is, after a trial-type proceeding and hearing. These requirements in-
clude, inter alia, the right to cross-examine witnesses,40 a guarantee that
the decision be based solely on the results recorded, including tran-
script and exhibits,4' a clear requirement that the hearing officer issue
"findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all ma-
terial issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record."' 42 These
procedures for "formal rulemaking" clearly are not favored in the fed-
eral system.43 Congress has not required any agency to follow such
procedures in more than ten years. In its landmark decision, United
States v. Florida East Coast Railway," the United States Supreme
Court held that a statute requiring rulemaking after a "hearing" could
and comment procedure when it "for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest," 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)
(1976), Illinois courts should strictly construe the requirement that an "emergency" exist before an
agency is allowed to dispense with the notice and comment procedure. Otherwise, the emergency
rule exception easily could be used to dilute the statutory mandate that the notice and comment
procedure be available prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule. Accord, Wagner
Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1020 (3d Cir. 1972).
36. Perhaps the most striking example in Illinois is the procedural framework of the Environ-
mental Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , §§ 1001-1051 (1977), described in Currie,
Rulemaking Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 457, 469-73 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Currie]. For a small sample of the variety of such procedures in federal statutes, see
DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:10 at 488-94.
It is hoped that the Illinois legislature will tailor the basic IAPA procedures to meet the
distinctive problems of rulemaking in widely varying contexts. See generally Hamilton, Proce-
dures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability The Need for Procedural Innovation in
Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276 (1972); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under
the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401 (1975).
See also The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976); The Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976); The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (1977).
37. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) with 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
39. Id., §§ 556-557.
40. Id., § 556(d).
41. Id., § 556(e).
42. Id., § 557(c).
43. Corn Prods. Co. v. Department of HEW, 427 F.2d 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
957 (1970) upheld a rule prescribing the percentage of peanuts which peanut butter was required
to contain. The trial-type rulemaking proceeding lasted nine years. Id. at 513, n.5. It produced a
voluminous transcript, and was perhaps the most striking example of the clumsiness of strict trial-
type procedure for rulemaking.
44. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
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be satisfied by the written notice and comment procedures of section
553.45 Only statutes which specifically required that rules be made "on
the record" would be construed as requiring trial-type rulemaking pro-
cedures. 46
The notice and comment procedures of section 5 of the IAPA are
designed to give "adequate opportunity to all persons affected to pres-
ent their views, the facts within their knowledge, and the dangers and
benefits of alternative courses. '47 Thus, judicial interpretation of those
procedures should "promote decisions based on proper and adequate
reasons supported by rulemaking findings. . . in a manner which not
only insures fairness to participants in the rulemaking process and pro-
tects the role of the courts on review, but which also preserves the off-
the-record flexibility of informal rulemaking. ' 48 Section 5 procedures
are designed to create a "framework for principled decision-making" 49
through a "genuine dialogue between agency experts and concerned
members of the public."' 50 It should be interpreted to accomplish these
ends. Fortunately there is a substantial body of law to guide Illinois
courts.
ADVANCE PUBLIC NOTICE
The IAPA51 requires that, "[plrior to the adoption, amendment or
repeal of any rule, each agency shall" publish a notice of its intended
action in the Illinois Register.52 This notice must be published forty-
five days before the agency's intended action and must include the pre-
cise text of the proposed rule, the new and the superseded material in a
proposed amendment, or the text of the material to be repealed. 53 This
requirement is far more specific than that of the federal Act, which
requires "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
45. Id. at 227-28.
46. For the distinction between rulemaking "on the record" and the newer concept of
rulemaking "on a rulemaking record" see DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:4 at 458. The latter notion is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 97-112 infra.
47. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 251. See [1946]
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1199-1201. See Bonfield, supra note 34, at 845-48 for an enumeration of
the policy considerations supporting the quoted statement of purpose, in the context of state
rulemaking procedure.
48. Verkuil, supra note 3, at 234.
49. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
50. Wright, supra note 3, at 38 1.
51. IAPA § 5(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(1) (1977).
52. The Secretary of State has general responsibility to maintain and publish the Illinois
Register, which is to be published at least once each week on the same day and mailed to subscrib-
ers. 1d.
53. Id.
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description of the subjects and issues involved, ' 54 and which does not
specify any particular period of time to elapse between the publication
of a notice of intended action and the adoption of a rule. 55 The IAPA
also provides that the agency must publish a citation to the specific
statutory premise upon which the rulemaking is based and authorized,
"a description of the subjects and issues involved," and the "time, place
and manner in which interested persons may present their" comments
concerning the proposed action.56 Further, the notice must state
whether the agency, "in [its] discretion," has decided to accept only
written comments, only oral comments, or both.57 The detailed re-
quirement of the Illinois Act and particularly tho requirement that the
text of the proposed rule be published, will doubtless reduce the
amount of litigation concerning the adequacy of notice. This require-
ment of adequate notice of rulemaking is closely related to the pur-
poses of a rulemaking procedure. 58 It is also related to a reviewing
court's minimal obligation to insure that all interested persons receive
sufficient advance notice of the proposed rule's contents so that they
can decide whether to intervene in the proceedings. 59 In light of these
considerations, it is important that the notice requirement be vigor-
ously enforced.
It should be noted that section 5 of the IAPA requires, in addition
to the text of the proposed rule, a statement by the agency of the "sub-
jects and issues involved. ' 60 The requirement, taken from the Revised
Model State APA 6' (which does not, however, require the text of the
proposed rule to be made public), and absent from the federal Act, 62
should be read so as to aid reviewing courts in assessing the agency's
consideration of the factors relevant to a particular rulemaking. Per-
haps more importantly, the requirement so interpreted would impose a
productive discipline on the agency's own thought processes. Thus,
under the "issues involved" requirement of the notice provision, an
54. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976).
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976) requires publication of the rule as adopted, thirty days before its
effective date, with stated exceptions. The parallel section of the IAPA makes final rules effective
ten days after filing with the Secretary of State, unless: the rule itself specifies a later date; or the
agency, which has complied with the requirements of section 5(b), designates the rule an emer-
gency rule, in which case the rule becomes effective upon filing with the Secretary. IAPA § 6, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1006 (1977).
56. IAPA § 5(a)(l), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(l) (1977).
57. IAPA § 5(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(2) (1977).
58. See text accompanying notes 19-30 supra.
59. 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 193 (1965).
60. IAPA § 5(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(l) (1977).
61. REVISED MODEL STATE APA, supra note 13, § 3(a)(1).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976).
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agency could be required to state "for the record" what it initially be-
lieved to be "at issue" in a particular rulemaking:63 the questions it
asked and the answers it gave in devising a particular rule. Such a
statement would reveal the breadth or narrowness of the agency's ini-
tial considerations, (surely an element of their "reasonableness"). It
would also allow a reviewing court to focus on agency treatment of
those comments which presented data or considerations that the agency
had not already taken into account in proposing the rule. In this regard
then, the Illinois APA specifically provides for an element of the initial
notice that would enhance internal agency decisionmaking processes
and would greatly aid a reviewing court in determining if a particular
rule was the result of "fair and reasoned decisionmaking." 64
As Judge Wright has observed, however, recent cases in the fed-
eral system, even without the textual support afforded by the "subjects
and issues" provision of the Illinois Act, have put "useful teeth" into
the notice provision of the federal Act. For example, "[i]f an agency's
empirical predictions constitute a substantial basis for its rule, the
methodology of prediction should be made public so that interested
parties have an opportunity to study and criticize it."65 Where there is
to be a flat rate for allocating costs between two services, "the agency
should specifically inform the public of this result, and not merely re-
port that some method of allocation is contemplated. ' 66 In Wright's
view, "It is the common spirit of such decisions that the agency must
make continuous disclosure of the facts and assumptions on which it
intends to rely in promulgating its rule."' 67 The House Judiciary Com-
mittee Report accompanying the original federal APA used the follow-
ing terms, equally applicable to the Illinois APA, to describe the federal
Act's notice provisions:
Notice must fairly apprise interested persons of the issues in-
volved, so that they may present relevant data or argument. The re-
quired specification of legal authority must be done with
63. See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 1973) (Lewis, J., con-
curring). This initial proposed rule should be the result of the agency's "considered judgment,"
and should not be merely an opening gambit to serve as a "bait for discussion. Id.
64. Verkuil, supra note 3, at 230.
65. Wright, supra note 3, at 380 (citing Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,
393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) and International Harvester Co. v. Ruck-
elshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
66. Wright, supra note 3, at 380 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d
1238, 1251 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). Of course, ratemaking is excluded from section 5 procedures
under the IAPA and the IAPA requirement that the text of the proposed rule be published should
serve to render Wright's stricture largely academic. See IAPA § 17, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. k27,
§ 1017 (1977).
67. Wright, supra note 3, at 380-81.
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particularity. Statements of issues in the general statutory language
of legislative delegations of authority to the agency would not be a
compliance with the section. Prior to public procedures agencies
must conduct such nonpublic studies or investigations as will enable
them to formulate issues. . . . Summaries and reports may also be
issued as aids in securing public comment or suggestions. 68
Courts have viewed the notice requirement as a serious one, since
failure to give adequate notice can thwart "genuine dialogue" in the
rulemaking process from the outset. Thus, "[a]n argument attacking
the adequacy of the notice on the ground that the enacted rule is
outside the scope of the proposed rulemaking notice will be scrutinized
on review precisely because the function of review is to determine if the
agency considered all relevant comments prior to rulemaking. '69
Cases remanding agency rules for want of adequate notice fall into
several categories. Notice has been held to be inadequate where the
final rules adopted went beyond the notice of rulemaking in significant
ways, either by extending regulation to matters not mentioned in the
notice of rulemaking, 70 or by regulating in greater detail or precision
than the original notice7' would reasonably have led interested persons
to expect. 72 Conversely, the agency should be entitled to develop its
final rule in response to comments made during the rulemaking proce-
dure; a showing based on the rulemaking record that this indeed oc-
curred would ordinarily defeat a challenge to the adequacy of notice.73
When such changes are significant, however, the agency should con-
sider, and a reviewing court might require, a further comment period,
before or after adoption of the final rules.
When a rule is being promulgated to comply with the require-
ments imposed by a statute, the public is entitled to notice of the statute
with which the proposed rules are designed to comply. 74 This allows
comparison of the rules with the statute.
68. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 258. See [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1197-98.
69. Verkuil, supra note 3, at 235.
70. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (final rule ad-
ded a pollutant not mentioned in the notice of rulemaking).
71. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (notice
of FPC's intention to issue a general statement extending its jurisdiction over a new area not
adequate as notice of specific ratemaking in that area).
72. Adequacy of notice should be measured by its ability to inform the general public, not
only experts in the field, of the proposed agency action, and the issues it involves. Wagner Elec.
Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (3d Cir. 1972).
73. See District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom.
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659 (Ist Cir.
1974). See also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
74. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 700 (D.D.C.
1974).
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The notice requirement also has been held to require notice of im-
portant reports or studies on which the agency intends to rely or which
are directly relevant to the rulemaking, such as the report of an advi-
sory committee. When such a report becomes available so long after
the notice of proposed rulemaking that the public is unable to submit
comments in light of the report, the notice may be held inadequate. 75
Actual notice of pending rulemaking procedures or the contents of
a proposed rule probably does not bar an individual who has received
such notice from contesting a rule for inadequate notice.76 The federal
Act requires general notice of proposed rulemaking to be published in
the Federal Register, "unless persons subject thereto are named and
either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in ac-
cordance with the law." 77 Since the Illinois Act contains no such "un-
less" clause in section 5, agency failure to publish the notice in the
Illinois Register would seem to be a claim which even those with actual
notice may assert.78
THE RIGHT TO COMMENT AND THE RULEMAKING RECORD
The Illinois Act provides that each agency shall "afford all inter-
ested persons. . . reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, argu-
75. See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfr. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). If such a research document is not cited in the Notice of
Rulemaking, a reviewing court may not permit the agency to include it in the rulemaking record
or to rely on it for support for the rule's rationality.
76. IAPA § 5(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(c) (1977) provides:
No action by any agency to adopt, amend or repeal a rule after this Act has become
applicable to the agency shall be valid unless taken in compliance with this Section. A
proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of non-compliance with theprocedural
requirements of this Section must be commenced within 2 years from the effective date
of the rule.
The statutory limitation period would seem to apply to affirmative actions to invalidate a rule for
procedural defects. It is not apparent whether such a limitation period would apply to the asser-
tion of the procedural invalidity of a rule as a defense in an enforcement proceeding brought
either before or after two years. See Wood Acceptance Corp. v. King, 18 111. App. 3d 149, 309
N.E.2d 403 (1974) (counterclaims under the federal "Truth in Lending" Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1665 (1976), may be asserted in an action initiated by a creditor to recover under the defective
contract, without regard to the one-year limitation period for affirmative actions, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(e) (1976)); Bonfield, supra note 34, at 874-75. Where the procedural defect is a serious
failure of notice it is questionable whether a limitation period would apply to either affirmative
actions or defenses. Isabell v. Department of Pub. Aid, 18 111. App. 3d 868, 310 N.E.2d 742 (1974).
77. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
78. The IAPA forbids a defense on claim of invalidity by a person with actual notice thereof
based on the agency's failure tofile an adopted rule with the Secretary of State or failure to make
the rule available for public inspection. IAPA § 4(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1004(c) (1977).
The absence of such a provision in section 5 together with the contrast with the federal APA noted
in the text, lends support to the proposition that violations of the notice provision of section 5 may
be asserted even by those with actual notice.
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ments or comments" 79 before the adoption, amendment or repeal of
any rule. To preserve this right, an interested person must submit a
request within fourteen days after notice of the proposed change is
published in the Illinois Register.8 0 The phrase "interested person" lit-
erally means anyone who wants to do so. No requirement of standing
exists.81 The federal APA gives interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking through the submission of written mate-
rial, "with or without opportunity for oral presentation. '8 2 By contrast,
the Illinois APA provides that data, views, arguments or comments
"may, in the discretion of the agency, be submitted either orally or in
writing or both."' 83 Thus the Illinois Act apparently gives the agency
discretion to provide that all submissions be oral, and that written
materials will not be received. In light of the usefulness of written sub-
missions, however, it is unlikely that any agency would prohibit their
use in any rulemaking procedure. A more difficult question involves
the use of oral testimony in rulemaking. The Revised Model State
APA mandates oral presentation of each rulemaking involving "sub-
stantive rules" and if twenty-five persons, a government unit or agency,
or an association with twenty-five or more members requests it.84
There may be situations, for example, where the proposed rule prima-
rily involves poor or relatively under-educated persons for whom writ-
ten submissions are not a realistic option and where specific facts and
questions are of some significance.8 5 In such a case, a "reasonable op-
portunity" for interested persons to participate in the rulemaking
would require oral presentations; agency failure to provide this oppor-
tunity would constitute an abuse of discretion.8 6
The federal Act also provides that "after consideration of the rele-
vant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted
a concise general statement of their basis and purpose." 87 The Revised
Model State APA requires the agency, if requested by an interested
person either before or within thirty days after the rule's adoption, to
"issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its
79. IAPA § 5(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(2) (1977).
80. Id.
81. Bonfield, supra note 34, at 852.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
83. IAPA § 5(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(2) (1977). The text of the Revised
Model State APA, is ambiguous as to whether the agency may choose to receive only oral com-
ments. See REVISED MODEL STATE APA, supra note 13, § 3(a)(2).
84. REVISED MODEL STATE APA, supra note 13, § 3(a)(2).
85. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
86. Ashman, Representation for the Poor in State Rulemaking, 24 VAND. L. REV. i, 20 (1970).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
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adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the consider-
ations urged against its adoption."8 8 There is no such explicit require-
ment in the Illinois APA. On the other hand, the IAPA requirement
that "[t]he agency shall consider fully all submissions respecting the
proposed rule" 89 is couched in stronger language than is the federal
requirement that the agency afford "consideration of the relevant mat-
ter presented." 90 If Illinois courts are to discharge their responsibility 9'
of enforcing the "full consideration" requirement, an agency statement
of "the significant issues faced by the agency and . . . the rationale of
their resolutions" 92 is indispensable. Such a statement merely makes
public, in a manner consonant with the purposes of a rulemaking pro-
ceeding, 93 the agency's actual consideration of the comments submitted
and allows the public, or a reviewing court, to determine whether the
agency has'complied with the "full consideration" requirement of sec-
tion 5. In the federal system, the judicial requirement that the agency
publish reasons for adopting the rule or for rejecting the comments9 4
has been alternatively based on the rather limited textual support of the
''concise general statement" provision or on the federal requirement of
agency "consideration of relevant matter presented. ' 95 The more de-
manding requirement of the Illinois Act that the agency "fully con-
sider" all submissions should be similarly interpreted. 96
Many of the most important developments surrounding notice-
and-comment rulemaking are incomprehensible without the notion of
the "rulemaking record." Such a record is a necessary precondition for
the mandated judicial enforcement of the rulemaking procedure of sec-
tion 5. This informal rulemaking record would include, under the Illi-
nois Act, the agency's proposed rules, its statement of the "issues"
raised by the rulemaking, 97 tentative empirical findings, important ex-
pert advice, a description of the critical experimental and methodologi-
88. REVISED MODEL STATE APA, supra note 13, § 3(a)(2).
89. IAPA § 5(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(2) (1977).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
91. IAPA § 5(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(c) (1977). An agency's statement of reasons
is equally important to a court making the "substantive" decision as to the rule's rationality.
92. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
93. See text accompanying notes 19-29 supra.
94. Wright, supra note 3, at 396.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976). See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975) (grounds
for requiring agency to state its reasons for informal action).
96. In Kennecolt Cooper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court recognized
and exercised its common law authority to require the administrative agency to explain the basis
of a rule made pursuant to the notice and comment procedure. 462 F.2d at 850. See also Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 881 (st Cir. 1973).
97. See text accompanying notes 60-68 supra.
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cal techniques on which the agency intends to rely, and written or oral
responses given by interested parties. 98 Further, it would lay out the
final rule. An accompanying statement should both justify the rule and
explain its normative and empirical predicates by referring to those
parts of the record generated by the earlier proceedings.99 "Conse-
quently, a proper record must reflect all of the relevant views and evi-
dence considered by the rulemaker, from whatever source, and-like a
mini-history-it must reveal if and how the rulemaker considered each
factor throughout the process of policy formation."' 00
The strong movement toward requiring that an identifiable
rulemaking record be before the agency when final rules are issued and
allowing judicial review only on that record' 0 stems ultimately from
the simple perception that full consideration of relevant factors re-
quires agency specification of what those factors are. 102 This minimally
requires, practically speaking, that a "bundle of paper [be] brought to-
gether in one place."'' 0 3 This movement, begun largely by the federal
decisions that review of agency informal rulemaking be based on the
"full administrative record,"' 4 has been accepted and developed by
Congress in a number of recent statutes granting agency rulemaking
authority. 0 5 In Illinois, the sophisticated rulemaking procedures of the
Illinois Environmental Protection Act 10 6 are part of the same move-
ment, and offer courts a model of the kind of procedures which may be
judicially applied to other agencies as part of its duty to enforce the
"full consideration" requirements of section 5. 07 As Professor Davis
98. Wright, supra note 3, at 395.
99. Id.
100. Id. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir.
1977); Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiensgesellschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912, 915-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1968). But see
Pederson, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 70 (1975). See also DAVIS,
supra note 3, § 6:10 pertaining to varying statutory provisions for rulemaking records.
101. DAVIS, supra note 3, at § 6:10 at 488.
102. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1781-84.
103. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:10 at 491.
104. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
105. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(d)(6)(A)-7607(d)(6)(B)
(1978), for example, provide:
(6)(A) The promulgated rule shall be accompanied by (i) a statement of basis and
purpose like that referred to in paragraph (3) with respect to a proposed rule and (ii) an
explanation of the reasons for any major changes in the promulgated rule from the pro-
posed rule.
(B) The promulgated rule shall also be accompanied by a response to each of the
significant comments, criticisms, and new data submitted in written or oral presentations
during the comment period.
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1112, §§ 1001-1051 (1977). See Currie, supra note 36, at 469-701.
107. The notion that the review of agency rules created pursuant to informal rulemaking pro-
cedures is "on the rule-making record" has already begun to appear in Illinois. See note 112 infra.
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has argued:
Although a statute which by its terms applies only to Agency A
obviously does not apply to Agency B, still when both legislators and
judges are groping on difficult problems of creating a good system of
rulemaking, an idea expressed in a statute that pushes out the fron-
tier of understanding is obviously available for use in any context by
judges or administrators or legislators.
The further development of rulemaking procedure is so vital
that all minds that may contribute ideas should be encouraged to do
so. Judicial minds clearly should be free to go anywhere for new
ideas, including statutes applying to single agencies, and they should
be encouraged to add what they can to those ideas, with a view to
perfecting a mechanism that can be fair and effective.10 8
It is not suggested that a court should transfer all the procedures
which a statute requires of one agency to the rulemaking procedure of
another. Other statutes, however, may provide guidance to a court
seeking to interpret the IAPA. It should be noted at this point that the
concept of a "rulemaking record" does not in any way transform infor-
mal rulemaking, "one of the greatest inventions of modern govern-
ment," 0 9 into adjudication" 0 or impose Procrustean formalities on
rulemaking. With the qualifications noted below, the agency may still
bring its expertise to bear on particular problems. "[Tihere still is room
for agency expertise to roam. All that is required is for the agency to
say where it has been.""'
The notion of an informal rulemaking record is the background
for the major "procedural" questions to be addressed by Illinois courts
in interpreting the IAPA's requirements of "reasonable opportunity to
submit data, views, arguments or comments" and the agency's obliga-
tion to "consider fully all submissions respecting the proposed rule." 112
108. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:11 at 494-95.
109. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15 (Supp. 1970). Davis argued in 1978
that court-initiated developments in rulemaking including the development of the notion of the
rulemaking record, have "vastly improved" that great invention. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:1 at
448.
110. The distinctions between trial procedure for rulemaking and informal rulemaking have
been catalogued. See DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:4 at 459-60.
1!1. Verkuil, supra note 3, at 248.
112. IAPA § 5(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(a)(2) (1977). The issues concerning judi-
cial review "on a rulemaking record" have already been addressed by several Illinois courts en-
gaged in pre-enforcement review of agency regulations in the environmental area. Compare
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 25 Il1. App. 3d 271, 323 N.E.2d 84 (1974),
aj'd in part and rev'd in part, 62 111. 2d 494, 343 N.E.2d 459 (1976) with United States Steel Corp.
v. Pollution Control Bd., 64 111. App. 3d 34, 380 N.E.2d 909 (1978) and Shell Oil Co. v. Illinois
Pollution Control Bd., 37 111. App. 3d 264, 346 N.E.2d 212 (1976).
The shared assumption of those decisions is that the "reasonableness" of an administrative
rule is to be assessed on the basis of the rulemaking record. The cases differ in the degree and
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One such issue is whether the IAPA mandate of full consideration
requires the agency to respond to comments submitted by "interested
persons." Although it would be impractical, at least where many sub-
missions were received, to "discuss in detail every item of fact or opin-
ion included in the comments submitted to it,"' ' 3 it is impossible to
conclude that full consideration was given to submissions unless the
agency has responded to at least those comments which raise crucial
factual, legal, or policy considerations." 4 In Portland Cement Associa-
tion v. Ruckelshaus," -5 for example, the court remanded the case to the
agency largely because of the latter's failure to respond carefully to
submissions which criticized the standards for industrial pollution con-
tained in proposed rules.
Another issue which the existence of a rulemaking record will
present to Illinois courts concerns factual support for the rule. Even
obviously "legal" questions such as the statutory authority to issue par-
ticular rules will often turn on the existence of particular facts," I 6 and
the "arbitrariness" of rules may be a partially factual question." 7 Two
distinct yet related questions arise in this context: whether regulations
must be supported by facts and, if so, whether such facts must appear
in the "rulemaking record" before the agency or be presented for the
first time before a reviewing court.
Neither question can be given an unqualified answer. The older
view, now in decline in federal administrative law, held that "where the
regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the pre-
sumption of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches
form of the scrutiny to be given the record. In Shell Oil and United States Steel the court was
content merely to assure itself that the rulemaking process had been conducted in a thorough and
procedurally adequate way. In Commonwealth Edison, the court conducted a much more de-
manding review of the evidence in the informal rulemaking record. Even the Shell Oil court
indicated that where the agency's technical expertise was not a significant factor in the rulemak-
ing, the court's review of the rulemaking record should be more searching, "analogous to that of
-an appellate court reviewing a trial court's decision." 37 Ill. App. 3d at 271, 346 N.E.2d at 218.
113. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
114. See DAvIs, supra note 3, at § 6:26 at 581, which points out that the federal Department of
Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7191(d) (1976), and the Clean Air Act Amendments, 42
U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7) (1976), specifically require such response. Such provisions are in accord with
the historical pattern in administrative law, and with the federal APA itself, by which common
law is codified by the legislature.
115. 486 F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). See also Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The process of agency
publication of proposed rules, receipt and consideration of comments, and publication of revised
rules need not go on adinfinitum. 478 F.2d at 632, n.51.
116. See Bio-Medical Laboratories Inc. v. Trainor, 68 111. 2d 540, 551-52, 370 N.E.2d 223, 228-
29 (1977); Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the
Optimum Forum, 75 COLtJM. L. REV. 1, 42 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Currie & Goodman].
117. Currie & Goodman, supra note 116, at 42-43.
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alike to statutes, to municipal ordinances, and to orders of administra-
tive bodies. I"" Furthermore, it was assumed that any facts which a
challenger might present to demonstrate the invalidity of a rule would
be presented for the first time in the reviewing court." 19
The court in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus120 ex-
pressed the more recent thinking on both points. That court stated:
It is not consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking proceeding to
promulgate rules on the basis of inadequate data or on data that, [to
a] critical degree, is known only to the agency. ... [I]nformation
should generally be disclosed as to the basis of a proposed rule at the
time of issuance.
Judicial review on factual matters normally is limited to subjects raised
by aggrieved parties in the administrative proceedings. 121 In a signifi-
cant number of federal cases agency regulations have been remanded
for failure to have crucial factual support within the rulemaking rec-
ord. 122 "[Tjhe focal point for judicial review should be the administra-
tive record already in existence, not some new record made initially in
the reviewing court."' 123 On the other hand, a reviewing court's reluc-
tance to engage in large-scale factfinding probably should not become
an absolute rule prohibiting any factfinding by a court reviewing an
agency's rules. 124 Minimally, a litigant should be permitted to intro-
duce evidence on matters which were not relevant to the rulemaking
procedure, but which may be significant to the review thereof, e.g., his
standing to sue.125
Both the doctrine that administrative rules must have factual sup-
port and the requirement that such support appear in the rulemaking
record are in a state of development. Thus, their exact confines are
118. See Pacific States Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935).
119. See DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:13, at 507.
120. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
121. Id. at 393-94.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 248-53 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'g 417 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537
F.2d 620, 634 (2d Cir. 1976); National Ass'n Food Chains, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
535 F.2d 1308, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615,
632-33, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
123. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
124. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 116, at 41-61. The Illinois Administrative Review
Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as the IARA], which pro-
vides for review on an exclusive administrative record, id. § 272(c), probably does not apply to
pre-enforcement review of administrative regulations. United States Steel Corp. v. Pollution Con-
trol Bd., 64 Ill. App. 3d 34, 380 N.E.2d 909 (1978). See also note 139, infra.
125. See Currie & Goodman, supra note 116, at 50. For an illuminating exchange on the
appropriate record on which judicial review of rulemaking should be conducted compare
Auerbach, Informal Rule Making:. A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures and
Judicial Review, 72 Nw. L. REV. 15 (1977), with DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:33 at 600-01.
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difficult to identify. The question as to when rules must be supported
by facts may, for the present, only be answered in vague, almost tauto-
logical, terms.' 26 There is a major difficulty in requiring all the factual
premises, however general, to be stated explicitly in the rulemaking rec-
ord: even the best decision makers are never fully conscious of all the
elements of a problem and its solution that they actually consider when
framing a rule.' 2" This seems to be a general characteristic of human
intelligence, even in its scientific applications. 2  On the other hand, a
court may be more vigorous in demanding that the record indicate con-
sideration of central, relatively specific, facts.
PETITIONS FOR THE ADOPTION OF RULES
Section 8 of the IAPA provides another important mechanism for
public participation in agency rulemaking: the right of "[any inter-
ested person" to petition for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal
of a rule. 129 "Interested person" should be given the same meaning it
has in section 5, implying no limitation on the right of any individual
or legal entity.' 30 The Revised Model State APA explicitly requires the
agency either to initiate rulemaking proceedings within a specified pe-
riod or to deny the petition in writing "giving reasons for the deni-
als."' 13 ' In this regard the IAPA is similar to the federal APA which
126. See DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:13.
127. See generally id., § 6:17.
128. See M. POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1967); M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE:
TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 169-202 (1958).
129. IAPA § 8, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1008 (1977), provides:
Any interested person may petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amend-
ment or repeal of a rule. Each agency shall prescribe by rule the form for petitions and
the procedure for their submission, consideration and disposition. If, within 30 days
after submission of a petition, the agency has not initiated rule-making proceedings in
accordance with Section 5 of this Act, the petition shall be deemed to have been denied.
The importance of the availability of such a mechanism is discussed in Bonfield, supra note 34, at
892. The device may be especially important for the immediate future, since the bulk of existing
agency rules have not been adopted pursuant to notice-and-comment, but were merely filed with
and certified to the Illinois Secretary of State pursuant to section 6, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127,
§§ 1006, 1007.01 (1977). Interested parties thus, almost never had an opportunity to comment on
those rules before they were promulgated. Normally, of course, the existence of the right to peti-
tion does not relieve the agency of its obligation to publish proposed rules and consider comments
before the promulgation of these rules as final. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1020
(3d Cir. 1972).
130. IAPA § 3.07, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1003.07 (1977) defines "person" as "any individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision, or public or private organi-
zation of any character other than an agency."
131. REVISED MODEL STATE APA, supra note 13, § 6. The full text of this section is as fol-
lows:
An interested person may petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amend-
ment, or repeal of a rule. Each agency shall prescribe by rule the form for petitions and
the procedure for their submission, consideration, and disposition. Within 30 days after
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states, "Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition
for the issuance of amendment, or repeal of a rule." 1 32 Federal agen-
cies have been required to state their reasons for denying a petition
under the latter provision, 133 and it seems appropriate to require Illi-
nois agencies to do the same. Whether Illinois courts will impose such
a requirement is largely dependent on how they interpret the somewhat
enigmatic last sentence of section 8.134 The question is whether that
sentence allows agencies not to respond to petitions, suggesting perhaps
that such action is not subject to judicial review, or whether the sen-
tence simply provides finality to such inaction for purposes of further
proceedings. The latter interpretation would, of course, imply no
agency discretion not to respond to a petition, and, by strongly imply-
ing a right to judicial scrutiny of denials, suggest that the agency must
respond. This interpretation seems to be the better one for several rea-
sons. In those instances where the drafters of the IAPA wished to pre-
clude judicial review of agency action, they did so explicitly. For
example, section 9 of the Act 35makes agency declaratory rulings unre-
viewable. Furthermore, several states have explicitly made petitions
for the adoption or change of rules unreviewable.13 6 The absence of
such a provision in section 8 strongly suggests no legislative intent to
preclude review. On the other hand, such review, for abuse of discre-
tion, should probably be limited to an agency's refusal to adopt,
amend, or repeal a rule which seriously jeopardizes basic statutory pur-
poses. 137 Of course, when the petitioner asserts a constitutional or stat-
utory right to the adoption, amendment, or repeal, closer scrutiny is
warranted. 138
submission of a petition, the agency shall either deny the petition in writing (stating the
reasons for the denials) or shall initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with Sec-
tion 3.
132. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976).
133. Nader v. Federal Aviation Administration, 440 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
134. See note 129 supra.
135. IAPA § 9, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1009 (1977).
136. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 3.560(138) (1978), Wyo. STAT. § 9-4-106 (1977). See also
United States Steel Corp. v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Comm'n, 575 P.2d 749 (Wyo.
1978).
137. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-16 (Supp. 1977). In light of the federal cases, Profes-
sor Davis's judgment is that "[a] court is unlikely to refuse to consider whether a denial of a
petition is unreasonable." DAVIS, supra note 3, § 6:28.
138. See, e.g., Florida Educ. Ass'n/United v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n, 346 So. 2d
551, 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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THE IAPA AND THE COURTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REVIEW OF
RULES
Even in the absence of a statutory provision for judicial review of
rules 139 the relationship of Illinois courts to the rulemaking function of
administrative agencies will be considerably altered by the adoption of
the rulemaking provisions of the Illinois APA. Illinois courts will con-
tinue to overturn agency rules which are arbitrary, capricious, unrea-
sonable, or beyond the scope of the agency's delegated authority. 140
Those "standards of review" will continue to serve quite nicely, supple-
mented with the enforcement of the procedural requirements of section
5.141 Nonetheless, the context in which they are applied is likely to be
changed.
There will remain an area of "substantive" review which judicial
scrutiny of the agency's adherence to the "procedural" requirements of
section 5 will not exhaust. However, a court, by ensuring that adminis-
trative rules were developed within the "framework for principled deci-
sion-making"' 142 which a "properly expansive reading"'' 43 of section 5
provides, will promote reasoned and balanced policy-making. An
agency which has given notice of its proposed rules, of the facts on
139. Substantive review of rules will, in the absence of such provision, continue to be per-
formed in actions to enjoin enforcement of the rules and/or declare them invalid, applying com-
mon law standards for review. See, e.g., Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 I11. 2d 540,
370 N.E.2d 223 (1977); Boyd v. Board of Trustees, Mitchell Pub. Water Dist., 15 Ill. App. 3d 152,
303 N.E.2d 444 (1973); High Meadows Park, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 112 Ill. App. 2d 220, 250
N.E.2d 517 (1969); Herman v. Village of Hillside, 15 Ill. 2d 396, 155 N.E.2d 47 (1959). It has been
persuasively argued that a state legislature should make comprehensive provision for judicial re-
view, including judicial review of informal rulemaking, setting forth methods and standards for
such review. Brodie & Linda, State Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope
of Review, 1978 ARIZ. ST. U.L.J. 537.
The Illinois Administrative Review Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 264-279 (1977), does not,
by its own terms, apply to rulemaking, and its purpose is quite clearly to provide for judicial
review of agency adjudication. Id. §§ 264-269. A stated exception to the IARA's inapplicability
to regulations makes it applicable to regulations "involved in a proceeding." Id. § 264. The ex-
ception allows a party involved in agency adjudication reviewable under the IARA to raise as an
issue in the adjudication the validity of the underlying regulation. Id. § 264. It would be a
strained reading indeed which would find the Act applicable to a pre-enforcement challenge to an
agency rule on the ground that the rule was a product of a rulemaking "proceeding." Such a
construction was decisively rejected in United States Steel Corp. v. Pollution Control Bd., 64 IlI.
App. 3d 34, 380 N.E.2d 909 (1978) despite ambiguous language in the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , §§ 1001-1051, 1029, 1041 (1977). The IARA's provi-
sion for an exclusive administrative record, and that limiting parties in judicial review to those
who participated in the administrative proceeding are particularly inappropriate for the review of
regulations.
140. See United States Steel Corp. v. Pollution Control Bd., 64 Ill. App. 3d 34, 40, 380 N.E.2d
909, 913 (1978) and the cases cited therein.
141. IAPA § 5(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(c) (1977).
142. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
143. See Wright, supra note 3, at 380.
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which it has relied in formulating them, and its perception of the cru-
cial issues involved, and which, having given interested parties the op-
portunity to comment, fully considers and carefully responds to the
important comments is less likely to fall victim to "blind prejudice or
.. .inattention to crucial evidence." 1'44 It may well be true in this
sense that "courts can more competently assess the rationality of the
rulemaking process than the merits of the resultant rules."'
1 45
If the ripeness doctrine does not prove a barrier to pre-enforce-
ment review of administrative rules, 146 the focus of Illinois courts will
almost inevitably shift in part to the rulemakingprocess in assessing the
"rationality" or "arbitrariness" of a rule. 147 Illinois courts searching
for the "appropriate balance between skepticism and deference,"'
148
may be inclined to ask whether the requirements of section 5, expan-
sively interpreted, have been met as a first step in the inquiry as to
whether a rule is arbitrary. "The paramount objective is to see whether
the agency, given an essentially legislative task to perform, has carried
it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and
irrationality in the formulation of rules for general application in the
future." 149
Illinois courts should be receptive to actions brought pursuant to
section 5(c)' 50 of the IAPA to contest rules under an expansive reading
of the requirements of adequate notice, reasonable opportunity to com-
ment, and full consideration suggested above since agency adherence to
such "procedural" requirements may, in some cases, obviate the need
for "substantive" judicial review.
It would be extremely naive, on the other hand, to credit the power
of purely procedural devices to achieve substantive fairness or to sug-
gest that the boundaries of judicial review under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard should be coterminous with even an expansive
144. Id. at 393.
145. Id.
146. Illinois courts generally maintain that Illinois law is completely in accord with Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), which held that pre-enforcement review of regula-
tions was permissible where "the impact of the regulations ... is sufficiently direct and immedi-
ate as to render the issue appropriate for judicial review .. ." d. at 152. See Shell Oil Co. v.
Pollution Control Bd., 37 111. App. 3d 264, 268, 346 N.E.2d 212, 224 (1976); Gromer Supermar-
ket, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 6 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1043, 287 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1972). This liberal
rule of ripeness does not extend to rules which have only been proposed, and not yet promulgated
as final. Roth-Adam Fuel Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 10 Ill. App. 3d 756, 295 N.E.2d 321
(1973).
147. See Verkuil, supra note 3, at 205.
148. Wright, supra note 3, at 395.
149. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
150. IAPA § 5(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 1005(c) (1977).
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reading of section 5. It is true that procedural and "substantive" modes
of review -may tend to merge. For example, a court convinced that an
agency has promulgated a rule which frustrates an important statutory
purpose may find that the agency could not possibly havefu/Iy consid-
ered a comment which so argues. Nonetheless, such judicial maneu-
vers may be needless, and often disingenuous, shuffles, leading to
endless remands. Judge Wright is correct in saying that review of
agency rules must be "substantive," that is, it must not routinely en-
graft new procedural requirements, such as cross-examination, onto
notice-and-comment rulemaking. But judicial review of agency rules
under the arbitrary and capricious test in many circumstances requires
a court to do more than merely assess, as a matter of empirical psycho-
logical fact, whether administrators "fully considered" factors con-
tained in comments submitted. Such an inquiry would exclude from
judicial scrutiny questions of the weight which should be reasonably
given the various factors considered.' 5' The latter may be merely a
question of scientific or technical judgment, deserving greater defer-
ence on the court's part. It may be a political or ethical question, pri-
marily assigning benefits and burdens to various groups or it may be a
legal question, determining the primary purpose of a statute. Judges
and commentators are just beginning to articulate the factors which
should be relevant in deciding how much a court should defer to an
agency's judgment on the many competing considerations involved in
rulemaking. 152
151. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1781-84.
152. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 1805-13.
